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ABSTRACT: 
 
Aims: This study examines the supply response of corn in the province of Quebec. 
Study design:  A time series design is implemented. 
Place and Duration of Study: Our analysis covers the period from 1985 to 2013 and uses 
the data of corn production in the province of Quebec. 
Methodology: A generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) 
process is used to model output price expectations and its volatility. 
Results: We found that application of the Farm Income Stabilization Insurance in Quebec 
neutralizes the adverse effects of price volatilities on corn production and generates a 
market power for corn producers. The change in the producers’ attitude towards risk is other 
implication of the insurance program. 
Conclusion: These results imply that implementation of the insurance program in the 
province of Quebec leads to an increase of corn production and consequently this increase 
in production can impose more compensation cost (paid by the insurance program) to 
governments. 
 
 
Keywords:  price volatility, GARCH, corn supply response, effective price, market price, 
ASRA. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Many types of risks affect agricultural activities; they include the risk of production (including 
climate risk, production yield risk, and disease), the risk associated with a possible change in 
government policies, the risk associated with fluctuations in the exchange rate, price risk and 
the risk of competition in international markets (Antón, Kimura and Martini, 2011). These 
risks increase uncertainty for agricultural producers and affect their behavior because they 
make it more difficult to estimate income, cost, and agricultural profit. The effects of these 
fluctuations on producers’ well-being justify the implementation of risk management 
strategies, intended to reduce the adverse effects of risks through identifying potential risks 
and planning risk-handling activities.  
Several studies show that price risk is perceived as an important source of risk in many 
countries (Antón and Kimura (2011); Palinskas and Székely (2008); Hall et al. (2003); Patric 
et al. (1985)).  Agricultural prices are very volatile and do not follow a particular trend (Rezitis 
and Stavropoulos, 2010; Rodríguez et al, 2010; European Commission, 2001). Given the lag 
between the production decision and marketing, farmers make decisions based on their 
expectations about prices. Therefore, price volatility leads to income fluctuations and affects 
farmers’ welfare. Several empirical studies have focused on analyzing the effect of price 
volatility on famers’ production decisions.1   
Behrmann (1968) analysed the effects of variability of prices and yields on supply response 
of four major annual crops - rice, cassava, corn and kenaf in Thailand during the period of 
1937-1963. He has examined the Nerlovian dynamic total supply response model 
incorporating the standard deviation of the price and yield in the last three periods, as risk 
factors, in this model. However, this was criticized for the fact that the Nerlovian price 
expectation model is not consistent with changing variance of the subjective probability 
distributions.  
Ryan (1977) introduced a simple linear model in which price risk variables were initially 
constructed from the variance and covariance of pinto bean and sugar beet prices during the 
three preceding years. The fixed weight lag scheme proposed by Fisher is used to weight 
these variance terms. 
Traille (1978) analyzed the US onion supply response to price risk. He has modeled the 
price risk using the difference between expected price and actual price. In this study, 
expected price is assumed to be a function of past observations on price.  
Seale and Shonkwiler (1987) have developed sub-regional supply and production models for 
U.S. watermelons. These authors modeled price expectation and price risk using rational 
expectation and the difference between expected and actual price respectively.  
 Holt and Aradhyula (1990), Holt (1993), Rezits and Stavropoulos (2008) and Rezits and 
Stavropoulos (2010) have modeled price volatilities using a GARCH model. In these studies, 
Holt (1993) used a rational price expectation model while the others suppose that prices 
follow an autoregressive form. Mbaga and Coyle (2003) used the Autoregressive Distributed 
Lag model (ADL) to analyze the reaction of beef production to price risk. They modeled price 
expectations and price volatility by the naive expectations model and squared errors of 
prediction respectively. 
                                                   
1 Dalal and Alghalith (2009) and Bobtcheff and Villeneuvey (2010) theoretically analyzed the 
impact of two sources of uncertainty, namely uncertainty on output price and on input price. 
For these authors, increasing the price risks (inputs and outputs) should reduce production. 
 However, these studies assume that price volatility is a source of risk that reduces 
production, but this variable cannot be presented as a measure of risk in all conditions. 
Implementation of price insurance programs is an example of situations in which the price 
risk would not significantly affect the production decision. Price insurance is a risk 
management tool, which allows producers to protect themselves against unexpected output 
price declines beyond market expectations. Consequently, application of these programs 
would result in non-significant effect of price volatility on production and provide an incentive 
to increase production.  In this study, we will show that implication of a price insurance 
program, as a risk-handling tool, neutralizes adverse effects of price volatility on agricultural 
production. 
This study focuses on price risk because of the high volatility of agricultural input and output 
prices (Huchet-Bourdon, 2012; FAO, 2011). The objective of our study is to explore the 
supply response of corn in the province of Quebec taking into consideration the presence of 
a price insurance program (ASRA) in this province and thus providing useful information to 
policy makers about the implications of Program ASRA.  
Corn cultivation is the third most important in the world after wheat and rice and remains one 
of the most important crops in Canada, particularly in the east (Lichtfouse and Goyal, 2015). 
Field corn is also Canada's third most important grain crop after wheat and barley 
(Agriculture and Agri-food Canada).2   The province of Quebec produces 33% of the corn 
representing the second corn producer of Canada (Agriculture and Agri-food Canada 2006). 
3,4 In Quebec's agricultural sector, an important consideration is the existence of the Farm 
Income Stabilization Insurance Program (Assurance Stabilisation du Revenue Agricole, 
ASRA).5 Under this program, the government compensates producers when the market 
price is less than the production cost. Consequently, ASRA reduces losses associated with 
price risk. Because of this insurance program, the market price is different from the price 
received by Quebec producers (effective price)6. This program may thus change supply 
response to prices. Consequently, we estimate two empirical models: one including corn 
supply response versus market prices7 and other including corn supply response versus 
effective prices8.  
First, in this study we analyze the behavior of corn producers in Quebec towards risk in 
absence of the price insurance program. Then we analyze if implication of ASRA as an 
                                                   
2 http://www.agr.gc.ca/fra/?id=1299248319435 
3http://www.agr.gc.ca/eng/industry-markets-and-trade/statistics-and-market-information/by-
product-sector/crops/crops-market-information-canadian-industry/market-outlook-
report/corn-situation-and-outlook-june-2009/?id=1378841170965 
4 Between the years 2009-2012, 76% of Quebec corn production was destined to animal 
feed (Statistics Canada and FPCCQ). See at 
http://www.grainwiz.com/industry/quebecmarket 
5 The sectors supported by ASRA, which reached their peak in 2002, comprise: fattened 
calves, steers, grain-fed calves, piglets, pigs, lambs, oats, wheat, corn, potatoes, milk 
calves, canola, barley, soybeans and apples. 
6 Although over estimation period, program Regime d'assurance du revenu brut (RARB) is 
also applied in the province of Quebec, but this program is not directly linked to producer 
prices. For this reason we supposed that this program is not directly linked to production 
decision. However ASRA directly affects the price received by producer.  
7 The model including market prices represents absence of ASRA. 
8 Specification of the model including effective prices includes the premium paid to 
producers under program ASRA, Programme canadien de stabilisation du revenu agricole 
(PCSRA,2003-2006) and program agri-stability (since 2007). 
 insurance program can manage the price risk and increase the welfare of producers. In other 
words, we analyse if under the insurance program the production decision is still sensitive to 
risk factors. Given that the insurance program is intended to protect Quebec producers 
against unexpected output price declines below production cost, we expect this program 
neutralizes the negative effects of price volatility on producer’s well-being. In addition, it 
would be of interest to study the implications of the insurance program on the sensitivity of 
production function to different risk factors. Furthermore, given that insurance program 
reduces losses associated with price risk, it is consistent to study if the implementation of 
this program affects the risk aversion of producers. 
In this study, we assume that prices follow an autoregressive process, and an asymmetric 
generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (Asymmetric GARCH) process is 
adapted to model the price volatility. This technique is appropriate when modeling 
agricultural price volatilities because it allows unconditional variance to vary over time. 
Furthermore, modelling price volatilities by the Asymmetric GARCH model, allows us to 
investigate the possible asymmetric effects of price shocks. The possible existence of 
asymmetry of corn price volatility can provide useful information about market structure. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The second section presents the econometric 
model of corn production and data. Then the empirical results are explained, and the final 
section presents the implications and conclusions of the study. 
 
2. METHODOLOGY  
 
 2.1. Supply response function  
 
Following Rude and Surry (2014), we assume that producers have a constant absolute risk 
aversion, and that the price distribution is normal. Under these conditions, the objective 
function of the producer is written as follows: 
  
1.  
 
Where  is price expectations,  is price variance, S is corn production,   is the absolute 
risk aversion parameter,  is square value of production and C  is the cost function. 
Profit maximization by the producer allows us to derive the following production function: 
 2.   
Where  is the expected price of corn (as output),  the expected price of fertilizer9 
(as input),   the volatility of corn prices,    the fertilizer price volatility and   the error 
term. We assume that, in the long term, production adjusts to its desired level (Nerlove, 
                                                   
9 Seeds and fertilizer are two principal inputs in the production of corn. The autocorrelation 
between the residuals of the seed price equation led us to remove this input from the model. 
 1956) and we incorporate lagged dependent variables (  in the model.10 To capture 
the effect of technological progress, we incorporate a trend variable ( ).  
 
2.2. Price expectation 
 
Following Rezitis and Stavropoulos (2010), we assume that prices follow the autoregressive 
process (AR): 
 3. +   
                                                        
 
where  is a polynomial lag operator,  is current price,  is an error term, is the 
information set of all past states available in period t-1 and is the conditional variance of 
.   
The Bayes Information Criterion (BIC) was used to determine the appropriate order of corn 
market and effective price equations while using the general to specific method of selecting 
the appropriate order of the fertilizer price equation.11 Consequently, price equations are as 
follows: 
 4.   
With: 
L=3 If our model includes market prices. 
L=1 If our model includes effective prices. 
 5.   
Where , and  represent corn price and fertilizer price respectively. The dummy variable 
( ) is introduced to capture the effect of structural changes. These structural changes 
generated by the oil price increase after 2006, engender the rise in agricultural prices. 
                                                   
10 Production lags imposed on the model are determined by the VARSOC method. This 
method reports the final prediction error (FPE), Akaike’s information criterion (AIC), 
Schwarz’s Bayesian information criterion (SBIC), and the Hannan and Quinn information 
criterion (HQIC) lag order selection statistics for a series of vector autoregressions of order 1 
to maximum lag. A sequence of likelihood-ratio test statistics for all the full variables of order 
less than or equal to the highest lag order is also reported. However, our tests suggest one 
lag in the model.  
11 Using BIC to determine the order of the fertilizer price equation has caused autocorrelation 
between the residual of the input price equation. 
 (Baumeister and Kilian, 2014). The study of Avalos (2014) confirms the changes in dynamic 
of corn price after 2006, which is related to oil price variation.  captures the effect of a trend 
on prices. 
 
2.3. Variance modeling 
Unlike the other time series models, generalized autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity models (GARCH) allow the conditional variance to vary over time, which 
is very relevant given the dynamics of agricultural prices. This characteristic of these models 
led us to use GARCH models to model price volatilities.    
An asymmetric GARCH model is used to investigate the possible asymmetric effects of price 
shocks. In this model, the past values of the error terms (  ) are added to the 
price variance equation. These terms allow positive and negative shocks to have different 
effects on volatility. In this model the volatility is defined as: 
  
6.  
According to equation 6, the conditional variance ( ) is defined as a linear function of q 
lagged squared residuals and p lagged past conditional variances. The following restrictions 
are imposed to ensure that the conditional variance is strictly positive: 
 
The stationarity of variance is guaranteed by (Bollerslev, 1986). Further, if 
the prices do not show the ARCH effect, we use simple moving variance to incorporate price 
volatility in the model. 
The residual test of price equations reveals the presence of serial auto-correlations in the 
squared residuals of the market and effective price of corn. This is one of the implications of 
the ARCH effect in the model, which led us to run the Lagrange Multiplier test to ensure the 
presence of heteroskedasticity in these equations. The results of this test, applied to 
equation 4 indicate that the hypothesis of no ARCH effect can be rejected at the 5% level of 
significance (Table A1 and Table A2). Consequently, we have modeled the volatility of the 
market and effective price of corn by a GARCH model. The order of the GARCH model is 
determined by a visual examination of the correlogram of the squared residual of the price 
equation and the results of the Ljung-Box (1976) Q test (Bollerslev, 1988).12 Then, to model 
corn price volatility, equation 6 can be written as follows:  
 
7.  
 
Where  is the volatility of the corn price. 
Further, the residual test of the fertilizer price equation and the Lagrange Multiplier test 
(Table A3) confirm the lack of ARCH effect in the fertilizer price equation. For this reason, we 
have incorporated simple moving variance of fertilizer price in the model. 
                                                   
12 Visual examination of the correlogram of the squared residual of the price equation and 
the results of the Ljung-Box Q test (1976) propose ARCH(1) model for modeling market 
price and effective price variance. 
  
2.4. Estimation approach 
 
Variables  ,  ,  and  generated by the GARCH model can be used to 
estimate equation 2. Pagan (1984) concluded that using variables generated by stochastic 
models to estimate a structural equation could cause biased estimates of the parameters’ 
standard deviations. One of the methods used to avoid this problem is the Full Information 
Maximum Likelihood (FIML) method. This method simultaneously estimates the supply 
response function, the price equation and the GARCH process parameters. Considering 
system of equations 8 (the model of market prices) and 9 (the model of effective prices), the 
joint distribution of and is written as follows: 
 8.   
 
9.  
9.  
 
10.  10.  11.  
Where = ∏t  represents the variance-covariance matrix. The log-likelihood 
function of the above system is given as follows: 
 11.    
  12.    
2.5. Data  
 
Our analysis covers the period of 1985 to 2013, and the supply response model is based on 
annual data. Data on seeded area of corn (corn production) are obtained from Statistics 
Canada,13 and are expressed in Hectares. 
Corn market prices14 and are obtained from Statistics Canada.15 The effective prices are 
built by adding compensation under the Farm Income Stabilization Insurance program, Agri-
Stability program and Canadian Farm Income Stabilization program (PCRA) to market prices 
(these programs are complementary). Compensation values are from the La Financière 
agricole (provincial government agency) website.16  
Fertilizer prices are from Statistics Canada17. Following Rezitis and Stavropoulos (2010), all 
prices are deflated by the consumer price index18 (2002 = 100). Table 1 presents some 
statistics of the data used in the analyses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
13 Table 001-0010 
14 Commodity prices are collected at point of first transaction, where fees deducted before a 
producer is paid are excluded (for example, storage, transportation and administration 
costs), but any bonuses and premiums that can be attributed to specific commodities are 
included. Commodity-specific program payments are not included in the price. 
15 Table 002-0043 
16 
http://www.fadq.qc.ca/statistiques_et_taux/statistiques/assurance_stabilisation/historique_pa
r_produit_dassurance.html 
17 The Farm Input Price Index (FIPI) measures the change through time in the prices 
received for agricultural commodities at the first transaction point. Much of the price 
information used in compiling the index is obtained from a monthly survey of farm 
respondents throughout Canada, tables 3280001 and 3280015. 
18 Price deflation by the industrial products price index (IPPI), as estimated by Rude and 
Surry (2014), generates the autocorrelation in the squared residuals of GARCH. 
 Table1: Data analysis 
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum Standard-deviation 
PC (Corn market 
price explained 
by dollars per 
ton) 
1.7 0.99 3.03 0.41 
PF (fertilizer price 
explained by 
dollars per ton) 
0.38 0.23 0.77 0.14 
S (Corn supply 
explained by 
hectare) 
340 350 225 000 449 000 68 336.9 
PCEF(Corn 
effective price 
explained by 
dollars per ton) 
2.15 1.35 3.91 0.5 
 
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Table 2 provides the results of unit root tests. Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and Philips-
Perron (PP) tests were conducted. The VARSOC method was used to determine the optimal 
lag of variables.  
 
 
 
Table 2. Results of unit roots tests 
 
Model without 
intercept and without 
trend  
 Model with intercept 
and without trend  
 Model with intercept 
and trend 
 
augemented 
Dickney  
Fuller (ADF) 
Philips
-
Perron 
(PP) 
 augemented 
Dickney 
Fuller (ADF) 
Philips
-
Perron 
(PP) 
 augemented 
Dickney 
Fuller (ADF) 
Philips
-
Perron 
(PP) 
PC  (3 lags) -1.418 -1.181  -4.036c -3.715c  -3.992c -3.680a 
PF (2 lags) -0.560 -0.44  -0.616 -0.993  -2.106 -2.373 
S (1 lag) 1.1 -1. 534  -1.529 1.143  -1.428 -1.651 
PCEF (1 lag) 
(4 lag) -0.807 -0.738 
 
-4.191c -3.765c 
 
-4.601c 
-4.097c 
 
 
 Corn seeded area and fertilizer price variables are non-stationary, while the results regarding 
corn market and effective price are mixed. This justifies the incorporation of trend variable in 
price equations as well as in production equation.  
 
3.1. Price analysis 
 
Tables 3 and 4 present the results of output and input price equations used to construct 
output and input price expectations. The equations of predictions are used as structural 
model equations.  
The estimation results of the output price equations are presented in Table 3.  
Table 3. Results of corn price equation 
Parameter Variable Coefficient 
(Model including market 
prices) 
 
Coefficient 
(Model including effective prices) 
 
Conditional mean 
b0 1 0.29(0.000) 
 
 
 
(0.000) 
0.43 (0.000) 
 
 
 
(0.000) 
b1 PCt-1  1.37 (0.000) 
 
                     0.85 (0.000) 
 b2 PCt-2 -0.58(0.000) - 
b3 PCt-3  0.10(0.000) - 
c1 Gt 0.06(0.000) 0.003(0.90) 
c2 Tt   -0.0009(0.000)     0.0009 (0.001) 
Conditional Variance 
α0 1      0. 005 (0.000) 
 
0. 02 (0.000) 
 α1 ε22(t-1)   0.94 (0.000) 
 
0.30 (0.000) 
 q1 ε2(t-1)    0.06 (0.000) 
 
0.12 (0.000) 
Test of market price equation’s residual generated by the autoregressive (AR) model (ε2t) 
      Q(6)  6.5 (0.37) 5.57 (0.47) 
      Q(12)  12.19 (0.43) 15.860 (0.20) 
      Q(18)  13.58 (0.76) 20.14 (0.32) 
      Q(24)  15.17 (0.91) 31.13 (0.15) 
      Q2 (6)    32.93 (0.000) 8.94 (0.18) 
    Q2  (12)                   77.41 (0.000) 
 
 
30.64 (0.002) 
 
 
 
 
    Q2 (18)   81.16 (0.000) 37.90 (0.004) 
     Q2 (24)                   82.43 (0.000) 48.82 (0.002) 
Test of market price equation’s residual generated by the SAARCH model  ( ε2t * h t-0.5 ) 
 
      Q(6)    8.66(0.19) 6.00 (0.42) 
      Q(12)  11.28(0.51) 12. 17 (0.43) 
      Q(18)  12.87(0.80) 15.20 (0.65) 
      Q(24)  19.5 (0.72) 28.65 (0.23) 
      Q2 (6)   1.03(0.98) 3.24 (0.77) 
Q2  (12)  18.39(0.11) 21.20 (0.26) 
 
 
 
 
 Q2 (18)  19.78 (0.34) 13.92 (0.73) 
Q2 (24)  25.90 (0.35) 31.42 (0.14) 
P-values are in parentheses 
According to the results, the coefficients of autoregressive terms of the price (b1, b2 and b3) 
are significant at the 1% level. The coefficient of the conditional variance expressed by  is 
significant, which indicates time-varying volatility. Furthermore the coefficients of conditional 
variance of market price and effective price sum less than unity (   = 0.94 and 
0.30 respectively), implying persistent volatility. 
The coefficient of asymmetry factor of shocks ( ) is significant at 1%, which confirms the 
presence of an asymmetric effect of shocks on volatility. The positive sign of  indicates 
that a positive shock in price causes more volatility than a negative shock of the same 
magnitude. This can be justified by strong position of corn producers in Quebec market, in 
the way that they can benefit unexpected positive shifts in demand by increasing the price 
but in the case of unexpected negative shifts they are not force to cut their prices (Rezitis 
and Stavropoulos, 2010). This is consistent with the structure of the Quebec corn industry 
which is characterized by small numbers of big producers19. This market power can also be 
justified by implementation of the insurance program which compensates the negative 
shocks of price and consequently leads to less volatility in the case of negative shocks than 
positive shocks.  
Finally the Ljung-Box Q statistic test was applied to the residuals ( ) and the squared 
residuals ( ) of corn price equations to analyze the performance of the model. The results 
of this test on  and  support the non-rejection of the hypothesis that the residuals of 
the output price equations are white noise, and the hypothesis for the absence of the ARCH 
effect is rejected. These results are one of the implications of the GARCH model presented 
by equations 4 and 7 (Bollerslev 1987). The application of an appropriate order of GARCH 
removes the correlation of squared residuals (Giannopoulos, (1995)). The Ljung-Box test 
applied to residuals and squared residuals of the SAARCH model indicates the absence of 
correlation between the residuals and squared residuals.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
19 In the province of Quebec 6160 corn farms devoted 402,441 Hectares of land in 
2011(Statistic Canada, table 004-0003). 
  
 
 
Table 4 presents the estimated parameters of fertilizer price (equation 5).  
Table 4. Results of fertilizer price equation 
Parameter Variable Coefficient 
 Mean 
b”0 1 0.05(0.01)  
 
 
(0.000) 
b”1 PF t-1 0.88 (0.000) 
 
b”2 PFt-8 -0.49(0.000) 
b”3 PFt-9 0.42(0.000) 
c”1 Gt 0.04(0.013) 
c”2 Tt 0.0002(0.25) 
Residual test of fertilizer price equation (ε3t) 
  Q(6)  2.95  (0.81) 
 Q(12)  9.81 (0.63) 
 Q(18)  10.68 (0.91) 
 Q(24)  13.55 (0.95) 
 Q2 (6)  1.22 (0.98) 
 Q2  (12)  6.56 (0.88) 
 Q2 (18)  7.94 (0.98) 
 Q2 (24)  8.22 (0.99) 
P-values are in parentheses 
 
According to the results of Table 4, the coefficients of autoregressive terms of fertilizer ( , 
 and ) are significant at the 1% level. 
The Ljung-Box Q statistic test, applied to the residuals ( ) and the squared residuals ( ) 
of the fertilizer price equation, affirms the absence of correlation between the residuals and 
the squared residuals of the input price equation. 
 
3.2. Supply response  
 
A Maximum Likelihood method was used to estimate the equations of structural model. The 
estimation of coefficient of determination (R2) confirms the good specification of the model 
(table 5). Finally, the Ljung-Box Q statistic test, applied to the squared residuals of supply 
response equations attests absence of ARCH effect in the model (table 5). The same result 
is found for the residuals.20 
Table 5 presents the results of the estimation of the structural model constructed by output 
price expectation, input price expectations, output price volatility and supply response 
equation. 
                                                   
20 The autocorrelation between the residuals of the model was examined by several tests, 
namely Ljung-Box (Table 5), Harvey, and Guilkey (Table A4 and A5). There is concordance 
between the results of these tests regarding the absence of residual autocorrelation of the 
model. 
  
 
 
Table 5. Results of corn supply response 
 
 
Parameter Variable 
Coefficient 
(Model including market 
prices) 
 
Coefficient 
(Model including effective 
prices) 
 	 1	 -17800000  (0.000) -18800000 (0.001) 	 PCte	 88128.6 (0.05) 85171.38 (0.10) 	 PFte	 -49029.8  (0.005) -29913.13 (0. 10)  	 hect	 -1267520  (0.08) -995104.9 (0.38) 	 heFt	 -3283563  (0.008) -3064009  (0.11) 	 SUt-1	 0.55 (0.001) 0.45  (0.009) 	 Tt	 8953.5  (0.002) 9477.14 (0.001) 
Residual test of supply equation  (ε1t) 
Q(3)     2.42  (0.48)                                 4.84 (0.18) 
Q(6)                                                        2.65 (0.85)                                      
6.07(0.41) 
Q(9)                                                         3.60 (0.93) 7.71 (0.56) 
Q(12)                                                         4.10 (0 98) 9.33 (0.67) 
Q2  (3)                                                          0.27 (096) 1.78 (0.62) 
Q2  (6) 0.28 (0.99) 2.85 (0.83) 
Q2 (9)                                                         0.30 (1.00) 5.13 (0.82) 
Q2 12)                                                         0.37 (1.00) 8.16 (0.77) 
                                                      Adjusted R2=0.67  
                           Adjusted 
R2=0.88 
P-values are in parentheses 
 
The coefficient of the expected price of corn ( ) has a positive sign, as expected. However, 
the coefficient of the expected price of fertilizer ( ) is negative, implying a decrease in corn 
production following an increase in the input price, which is also expected. The negative sign 
of the coefficients of corn price volatility and fertilizer price volatility (respectively  and  ) 
implies that production responds negatively to an increase in volatility. These results are 
consistent with prior studies (such as Holt and Aradhyula (1990), Holt (1993), Rezits and 
 Stavropoulos (2008), Rezits and Stavropoulos (2010), and Rude and Surry (2014)). The 
coefficient  shows the adjustment speed to desired output. The coefficient captures the 
effects of the corn production trend. 
 The results illustrate the significant effect of risk factors (expected output and input price, as 
well as variance of input and output price) on corn production in the absence of insurance 
program. However, variance of output and input price can not affect corn production when 
insurance program is implemented.  It is not surprising since insurance program is intended 
to stabilize the producers’ income in Quebec. In other words, this program prevents 
producers’ income fluctuations following price volatility and thus this insurance program 
engenders corn production (as a product covered by the insurance program) not to be 
affected by price volatilities. Consequently we can conclude that implementation of 
insurance program in the province of Quebec was successful to neutralize the adverse 
effects of price volatilities on corn production. Furthermore a comparison between the supply 
response of the model including market prices and the model including effective prices 
provides important information for policy makers. As illustrated in figure 1 implementation of 
insurance program increases corn production thus we can conclude that the premium paid to 
corn producers has a positive effect on corn production in the province of Quebec. 
Implementation of insurance program in the province of Quebec leads to an increase in corn 
production through motivating actual producers as well as potential producers. The premium 
paid to corn producers, by neutralizing the negative effects of price volatility, motivates 
producers to increase their production. On the other hand this premium helps small 
producers to manage the risk and to be able to compete in the market.   
  
 
 
Estimation of corn supply elasticity21 relative to expectations of corn effective price (0.523 in 
short term and 0.952 in long term), to expectations of fertilizers price (-0.124 in short term 
and -0.275 in long term), to corn price volatility (-0.069 in short term and -0.126 in long term) 
and to fertilizer price volatility (-0.037 in short term and -0.082 in long term) confirm the Le 
Chatelier principle (Samuelson, 1947).22 These estimations imply that the corn supply 
                                                   
21 We used estimated parameters of the model and the simple average of variables to 
estimate elasticity. 
22 The Le Chatelier principle implies that long-term elasticities of supply and demand are 
more important than short-term elasticities. 
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Fig.1: Predicted corn supply in the province of 
Quebec (1985-2013)
Supply in absence of ASRA Supply in presence of ASRA
 response is more sensitive to output prices and input price than to volatilities23. This can be 
justified by application of insurance program, which neutralizes the effects of price 
fluctuations on the supply of corn.  
These estimates also imply that corn supply response is more sensitive to the expected 
price of output than to the expected price of inputs. Several reasons may explain this result. 
First, the gap between the production decision and purchase of inputs is shorter than that 
between production decisions and marketing (Nijs, 2014). Further, input prices are positively 
correlated to the price of outputs. In other words, the increase in input prices causes a rise in 
output prices. Therefore, production is less affected by input price variations than by that of 
output price.   
Estimation of supply elasticities in the model including market prices (supply elasticities are 
0.43, -0.2, -0.08 and -0.04 in short term and 0.958, -0.45, -0.19 and -0.088 in long term 
relative to expected output price, expected input price, output price volatility and input price 
volatility respectively) reveals that implementation of the insurance program decreases the 
sensitivity of corn supply response relative to risk factors in long term. 
Furthermore, our estimation of supply response elasticity relative to corn market price is 
consistent with that obtained by Haile, Brockhaus and Kalkuhl 24 In United states.25  
 
3.3 Relative marginal risk premium index 
 
Finally, we analyzed the behavior of corn producers in Quebec towards risk by calculating 
the Relative marginal Risk Premium (RRP).	This index is determined by the negative of the 
ratio of the variance and price elasticity of supply (Holt and Moschini, 1992):    
 
13.  
 
Where   
If   
If   
 
The positive and significantly different from zero26 value of input and output mean RRP 
(indicated in Table 6) in the models including market prices implies risk-averse behavior of 
corn producers rather than risk-neutral behavior in the absence of the insurance program 
(Rezitis and Stavropoulos, 2010). However, non-significant coefficients of output and input 
price volatilities in the model including effective prices imply risk neutral behavior of corn 
producer in the presence of insurance program. In other words, implementation of the 
insurance program, through managing and neutralizing the risks associated to negative 
shocks of price, changes the behavior of corn producers towards price risk. This behavior 
change from risk aversity to risk neutrality of corn producers affects corn supply and thus 
well-being of producers.  
 
                                                   
23 Price volatilities are not significant.  
24 Unfortunately, we did not find other studies estimating corn supply elasticities in Canada.  
25 Agricultural prices in Canada and United-States are integrated. 
26 Coefficient of all risk factors are significant.  
  
 
Table 6. Estimation of Relative marginal Risk Premium index (RRP) of Quebec corn 
producers 
 Mean RRP in the model 
 including the market price 
Mean RRP in the model 
 including the effective price 
Output 0.2 0 
Input  0.2 0 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
The impact of price fluctuations on the supply response of agricultural products has been 
considered one of the major issues in the literature. Many theoretical and empirical studies 
have analyzed the effects of price risk on the supply response of different agricultural 
products. They mainly defined price fluctuation as a source of risk that can reduce 
production. However, implementation of price insurance programs, as risk management 
tools, helps producers to insure themselves against unexpected negative shocks of price. 
Consequently, application of these programs would result in non-significant effect of price 
volatility on the supply response and provide an incentive to increase production.   
This paper investigates the supply response of corn in the province Quebec where a price 
insurance has been implemented. Given that the insurance program could affects the 
agricultural supply response to prices, we studied the supply response of corn to market 
prices, along with the effective prices defined as market prices plus compensation of the 
insurance program. An asymmetric GARCH procedure is used to model output price 
expectations and its volatility. However, the absence of the ARCH effect in input prices led 
us to model input price volatility by a simple moving variance. The model parameters were 
estimated by the Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) method.  
We have shown that application of the insurance program in Quebec affects the supply 
response of corn to risk factors and neutralizes the adverse effects of price volatilities on 
corn supply response. In other words, despite the emphasis of the literature on the 
importance of price volatilities on the supply of agricultural products, the results of our study 
show that output and input price volatilities are not the major factors of risk for corn producer 
in Quebec. These results are justified by application of the insurance program which 
stabilizes corn price and prevents production decision to be sensitive to price volatilities. 
Although, the output and input price expectation are still significant risk factors in Quebec 
corn production, the results show that implication of the insurance program decreases the 
sensitivity of corn supply to these factors of risk.  
We have analyzed the structure of corn market in the province of Quebec. The results imply 
market power of corn producers in Quebec in a way that that they can benefit of the positive 
shocks in demand but they are not forced to reduce the prices in the case of negative 
demand shocks. This market power can be justified by the structure of the Quebec corn 
industry as well as by implementation of the insurance program. 
We have also estimated supply elasticity relative to output and input price expectations, as 
well as to price volatilities. These estimations demonstrate that corn producers in Quebec 
perceive output price expectations as the most important risk factor. Further, results show 
lower sensitivity of supply to input prices than to output prices. This is justified by correlation 
 between output and input prices as well as less important delay between production decision 
and input purchase than between production decision and marketing. Another important 
finding is that the corn supply elasticity estimate relative to output price expectation is of a 
similar order of magnitude to that of prior studies.  
Finally, we have analysed the implications of the insurance program in Quebec corn 
production. We concluded that compensations of this program make producers not perceive 
input and output price volatilities as risk factors when their output is guaranteed under the 
insurance program while price volatilities are significant risk factors in absence of ASRA.  
On the other hand, application of the insurance program in Quebec changes the attitude of 
corn producers from risk averse to risk neutral. This behavior change, , through motivating 
actual producers and potential producers, increases corn production and consequently this 
increase in production can impose more compensation cost (paid by the insurance program) 
to governments.  
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APPENDIX 
 
 
Table   A1. Lagrange Multiplier Test (ARCHLM) for corn market prices (AR(3)) 
 
Chi2 Degrees of freedom Prob>chi2 
40.59 1 0.000 
Null hypothesis: No ARCH effect                                     Alternative hypothesis: ARCH(p) 
disturbance 
 
 
Table A2. Lagrange Multiplier Test (ARCHLM) for corn effective prices (AR(3)) 
 
Chi2 Degrees of freedom Prob>chi2 
20.782 10 0.02 
Null hypothesis: No ARCH effect                                     Alternative hypothesis: ARCH(p) 
disturbance 
 
 
Table A3. Lagrange Multiplier Test (ARCHLM) for fertilizer price 
Chi2 Degrees of freedom Prob>chi2 
3.813 8 0.87 
Null hypothesis: No ARCH effect                                     Alternative hypothesis: ARCH(p) 
disturbance 
 
 
 
 
Table A4. Harvey and Guilkey autocorrelation test applied to corn supply function 
versus market price 
Single Equation Autocorrelation Tests 
 Harvey LM test Rho Pvalue>chi2 
Supply equation          0.005 0.0003         0.94 
Corn market price equation        0.10 0.0057             0.74 
Corn volatility equation        0.74 0.0392             0.39 
Fertilizer price equation        0.64 0.0338             0.42 
Fertilizer volatility equation      2.4 0.1266             0.12 
Rho: Correlation coefficient 
Null hypothesis: No Autocorrelation 
 
  
Table A5. Harvey and Guilkey autocorrelation test applied to corn supply function 
versus effective price 
Single Equation Autocorrelation Tests 
 Harvey LM test Rho Pvalue>chi2 
Supply equation           0.93   0.05          0.33 
Corn volatility equation            0.66   0.03             0.41 
Fertilizer price equation            2.62   0.13             0.11 
Fertilizer volatility equation            2.66   0.13             0.11 
Rho: Correlation coefficient 
Null hypothesis: No Autocorrelation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
